Inside Africa: Hundreds Of Citizens Exhibit Their Support For Russian Intervention In Mali
MICHELE CATTANI
Hundreds took to the streets this past week to proclaim their support for the Malian military after the state reasserted control of the unstable Sahel state. The recent coup was launched on May 24 when the military officers, led by Vice President Assimi Goïta, detained transitional president Bah Ndaw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane before stripping them of their powers and freeing them. Ndaw and Ouane led a transition government installed in the wake of a military coup in August, which deposed elected President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. The situation marks Mali’s third coup d’état in ten years, following the 2012 and 2020 military takeovers with the latter only occurring nine months earlier. New elections are promised to occur in 2022.
While a great deal of support patriotism was exhibited towards the Malian military, some celebrators also waved Russian flags and toted placards attacking France, Mali's former colonial master, which has deployed troops to the country to help it in its fight against jihadist insurgents. "We want the French to leave and Russia to come in," said Adama Dicko, a protester.
Mali has been notorious for its instability in recent years, as it is difficult to enact reforms quickly given the state’s landlocked geographic positioning and poor economic status. These conditions have acted as an ideal opportunity for foreign entities to step in and exert their international power.
One may question why Russia came to be the geopolitical winner in Mali’s coup. In contrast to France, which cultivated close relations with Keita and has seen its political leverage in Mali dwindle as a result of the coup, Russia has immediately established cordial relations with Mali’s transitional government. Since Russia possesses a diverse array of partnerships in Mali and Sahel countries are frustrated with the counterterrorism policies of Western powers, Moscow could leverage the Mali coup to secure economic deals and bolster its geopolitical standing in West Africa. Kremlin-aligned research institutes and media outlets have consistently framed France’s counterterrorism operations in Niger and Mali as a façade for the extraction of the Sahel’s uranium resources.
The state’s 2012 coup led to militant Islamists exploiting the chaos and seizing the north of the country. France intervened at the request of Mali's government in 2013 to help quell a jihadist rebellion that broke out the previous year. French troops helped regain territory, but attacks have continued as the insurgents have capitalized on the persistent political instability in the region. The Islamist insurgency is still raging to this day in the vast nation of 19 million people and has now bled over to neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger. France has some 5,100 troops deployed across Africa's arid Sahel region as part of its anti-jihadist force Barkhane, and their lack of progress has led to public confidence waning over the army leaders' ability to tackle the Islamist insurgency.
The country's military involvement in Mali is nonetheless criticized on social media in Mali, leading to frequent protests. Many Malians view France’s Operation Barkhane counterterrorism initiatives in the Sahel as a guise for neocolonialism, viewing the Russians as a more tasteful alternative to provide aid to the state. In November 2019, demonstrators in Bamako urged Moscow to repel Islamist attacks in Mali like it did in Syria. Prominent opposition figures, such as the leader of the African Solidarity for Democracy and Independence Party Umar Mariko, have actively courted Russian arms and technical support. At the Independence Square demonstrations in Bamako that followed the coup, protesters were spotted waving Russian flags and holding posters praising Russia for its solidarity with Mali.
As West African countries are increasingly concerned about regionwide instability emanating from the Mali coup, Russia has tried to position itself as a counterinsurgency partner for countries in the region. In a September 9 interview with Sputnik, Cote d’Ivoire’s Ambassador to Russia Roger Gnango called for increased military cooperation with Russia, due to instability resulting from the Mali coup. Although Russia is unlikely to deploy private military contractors (PMCs) to the Sahel, it could leverage instability resulting from the Mali coup to sell arms and expand the strategic depth of its military cooperation agreements with Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. These conditions grant Russia the opportunity to continue to assert influence across the continent, with many states welcoming Russian intervention with open arms.
Yet not all protesters were critics of the French intervention, however. Fanta Diarra, a protester, told AFP that France is not a problem and "Russia will not be our solution.”
Ovigwe Eguegu, a policy analyst based in Abuja, Nigeria, says Mali’s junta is also being opportunistic. “Malians understand that Russians and the French are rivals in the region. Malians see that and want to leverage on that rivalry and want to drag Russia into the mix so as to use its influence to ensure that Goïta has that international clout that he so desperately needs to carry out his agenda.”
Due to its balancing strategy in Mali and the stagnant progress of Western counterterrorism efforts, Russia could leverage the coup as a means of expanding its economic and security links in the Sahel. As other great powers are forced to recalibrate their approaches to counterinsurgency in the Sahel, Russia could be a rare geopolitical beneficiary from Mali’s security crisis.