South Pacific: Shaping the Blue Pacific: Papua New Guinea’s Strategic Role at 50

mageBROKER/Sunny Celeste

On September 16, 1975, Papua New Guinea gained its independence from Australia as an administrative state. Governor General John Guise stated that “we are lowering the flag, not tearing it down.” This peaceful transition of decolonization instills confidence that Papua New Guinea and Australia are required to frame closer bilateral partnerships. In an era defined by geopolitical contests, particularly in the Pacific, Australia must work with PNG as a sovereign partner in shaping the Blue Pacific continent's security, development, and diplomatic architecture.

The need to build trust, resilience, and cooperation with Port Moresby is greater than ever. Australia's historical narrative too often casts PNG as a peripheral actor, one dependent on aid, yet it holds an invaluable role in regional forums such as the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), where strategic leadership from Pacific nations is vital to address concerns of climate change, and bolster structural resilience against rising geostrategic competition. 

One key challenge is aligning Australia's security priorities with those of the broader Pacific. While Canberra has focused on strategic competition, particularly the influence of Beijing, many Pacific Island countries place greater emphasis on climate change as the primary existential threat. PNG is uniquely positioned to bridge this divide, championing a shared vision of a free, open, and resilient Pacific as laid out in the Boe Declaration, to which Australia is a signatory.

Yet, Australia’s credibility across the Blue Continent is being tested. China has emerged as the second-largest aid donor in the Pacific, funneling foreign direct investment into bilateral security and economic arrangements with the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, and the Cook Islands. While framed as development, much of this assistance aligns more closely with elite capture and securitized aid. The deployment of a PLA Navy flotilla in the Tasman Sea adds further urgency to Australia's regional engagement to ensure norms and values remain at the epicenter. 

To counterbalance this, Australia must reaffirm its commitment to the Boe Declaration—not merely as a document but as a guiding principle for inclusive, Pacific-led security cooperation. This includes acknowledging non-traditional threats such as environmental degradation, resource insecurity, and transnational crime, while supporting regional ownership and capability-building towards resilience and a common future. 

Australia’s shared history with PNG is a foundation to build on. Kokoda stands alongside Gallipoli in Australia’s national memory, symbolizing sacrifice, endurance, and the deep bonds formed between Australian and Papua New Guinean soldiers during World War II. That legacy of a shared shoulder-to-shoulder burden facilitating camaraderie endures and must underpin today’s strategic cooperation.

This is none more apparent than the recent Bilateral Security and Defense Arrangement, signed by Defense Ministers Richard Marles and Dr Billy Joseph. This is a welcome step, but it must be more than a symbolic gesture. The agreement needs to be backed by genuine reform, social license, and investment in long-term relationships, rather than a transactional approach focused solely on capability.

As military strategist Michael Evans notes, “if the 20th century was the age of predictable threat, the 21st century is the age of unpredictable risk.” Australia must embrace a strategic culture that moves beyond traditional alliances like ANZUS and toward regional self-reliance. Paul Dibb’s 1987 Review remains relevant, reminding us that Australia’s defense priorities and security interests lie in the immediate arc of Melanesia and Micronesia, not in far-off distant theatres.

The Pacific archipelago, including PNG, forms a natural buffer between mainland Australia and Southeast Asia. In defense planning, this region has long been identified as the ‘air-sea gap’—a likely vector for any adversary approaching from the north. To strengthen deterrence and regional integration, the Australian Defense Force (ADF) must embed itself more deeply into the cultural and linguistic fabric of the region.

This means pursuing cross-cultural development and linguistic interoperability. Basic proficiency in Tok Pisin and Bahasa Indonesia should be standard for ADF personnel stationed in Darwin and Northern Australia. Training exchanges, joint exercises, and doctrine-sharing with the PNG Defense Force should be expanded, ideally paving the way for a broader “Pacific Battalion” model. Such a unit could bolster recruitment, deepen trust, and address regional crises, including those driven by climate and humanitarian emergencies.

However, defense is only one dimension of regional legitimacy. PNG’s credibility as a Pacific leader will depend on how it resolves internal challenges, chief among them the long-delayed implementation of Bougainville’s independence referendum. In 2019, 97.7% of Bougainvillea’s voted in favor of independence. Yet, five years later, the issue remains politically unresolved.

Australia has an opportunity to support a peaceful, democratic transition, as it did in 1975. New Zealand’s appointment of former Governor-General Jerry Mateparae as a mediator shows international momentum, but Australia must also press Port Moresby to respect the outcome and engage in constructive dialogue. A legitimate, self-determined Bougainville would reflect well on PNG’s leadership credentials across the Pacific.

As PNG turns 50, Australia must look beyond rhetoric and recognize that Port Moresby is no longer a junior partner—it is a peer. Deepening our defense ties, supporting regional development, and working through Pacific-led institutions will ensure both countries contribute meaningfully to a cooperative and resilient Oceania. In a time of geopolitical fracture, it is these enduring partnerships, not great and powerful friends, that will determine Australia’s place in the region.