European Central: Kosovo and Serbia’s Powderkeg Relationship Has a Rare Chance to Cool Down.

Engin Akyurt

Warfare has a long history of lingering where war was once waged. Craters, minefields, and ripped-apart families remain for decades after the bombs stop dropping. But while it is somewhat true that time heals all wounds, the fresher the wound, the harder it is to be fully healed. 

Since the end of the Kosovo conflict, Kosovo and Serbia have tended to their wounds, and with the assistance of NATO and the EU, there was hope after the war ended in 1999 that a new chapter in the Balkans might be on the horizon. But all conflicts, especially those driven by ethnic and cultural differences, are far easier to start than to solve.

Only meager progress has been made over the years to rekindle a basic level of dialogue between the two nations. But with Serbia facing a determined protest movement, and Albania navigating a nine-month long political crisis, circumstances might be ripe for progress to restart.

The Powderkeg Never Runs Dry

Otto von Bismarck once said that “one day the great European War will come out of some damned foolish thing in the Balkans.” He was 30 years early, but conflict in the region continues to make his statement ring true. The origins of Serbia and Kosovo’s disdain for each other is centuries old, with Serb Orthodox Christian monasteries and sites of Serbian national history standing in the Albanian-dominated region of Kosovo.

But in 1998, tensions between the Serbian republic (then a part of Yugoslavia) and the not-yet independent region of Kosovo boiled over into a conflict that displaced hundreds of thousands and involved horrific war crimes primarily, but not exclusively, against Kosovar Albanians. 

The fighting came to a halt after a 78-day long bombing campaign by NATO, which eventually forced the Serbian forces out of Kosovo. Talks between both sides failed to yield meaningful reconciliation, and when Kosovo declared independence in 2008, it did so with Europe's backing. But nations like Russia, China, Serbia, Slovakia, and Spain all refused to recognize it and backed Serbia instead.

Today, those tensions still persist, and sporadic fighting still breaks out. In 2023 Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti moved to install ethnic Albanian mayors in Serb majority areas and forced ethnic Serbs in Kosovo to use Kosovan number plates on their cars, triggering a deadly incursion by heavily armed Serb gunmen and the worst violence in a decade in 2023.

More recently in January of this year, protests and clashes erupted after Kosovo’s government claimed to have dismantled Serbian-run institutions in the north of Kosovo that controlled wages, postal services, and healthcare. The government also banned the use of the Serbian dinar currency, a major slight to the 50,000 strong Kosovo Serb population that lives in north Kosovo.

Europe’s Newest Nation Versus Europe

Despite the original backing of Kosovo independence, most of Europe has come together to condemn Kosovo’s policies. Both the continent and Kosovo’s opposition parties see Kurti’s government as one focused on cementing his own authority and control in the northern region. 

After the clashes in 2023, the EU imposed restrictive economic sanctions on Kosovo, while both Serbia’s and Kosovo’s EU accession processes have been frozen until both nations make specific reforms. Those reforms include the need for Kosovo to establish an association of Serb municipalities to allow greater self-governance for Serbs, something Kurti has rejected and actively undermined.

Even the United States, one of Kosovo’s closest allies since its independence, suspended dialogue regarding closer economic and diplomatic ties with Kosovo last year due to the nation’s “tensions and instability.”

Additional pressure from Europe includes France and Germany’s refusal to allow Kosovo’s accession to the Council of Europe, and the aforementioned sanctions have stalled at least 150 million euros in EU-funded projects, with some estimates rising to more than 600 million euros. 

While some of these sanctions have been lifted recently, Kosovo’s media and opposition parties have long criticized the deterioration of relations with the United States and Europe, as many Kosovars see the potential boons of eased sanctions and increased investment in the import-dominated economy. EU candidate status would go even further to spur economic growth in the beleaguered nation.

Will Pressure Yield Progress?

With all of this in mind, many voters went into the February 2025 elections in Kosovo disillusioned with Kurti’s combative and aggressive policies towards both Serbs and the EU. As a result, while Kurti’s party won the election, for the first time since it came to power in 2021 it has needed to find an opposition party to form a coalition with. None have come calling.

A nine-month long political deadlock has ensued since, and some progress was made on October 10 when Kosovo’s Parliament elected its full leadership, including a representative from the ethnic Serb minority. But a mere 16 days later, the same parliament failed to elect Kurti as prime minister, increasing the likelihood that a snap election will be called.

This pressure, both from within and without, may force Kurti’s hand to make concessions to the Serb communities, and if not, the outcome of potential snap elections may put someone in power who will. But on Serbia’s side, pressure is also rising from domestic protests over government neglect and corruption and international condemnation over Belgrade’s repression and authoritarian tilt.

While Serbia has largely abandoned the EU accession process, there is still opportunity for a breakthrough for both Serbia and Kosovo, an opportunity that recently received a boost from the EU.

At the start of this year, the EU appointed a new Special Envoy, Peter Sørensen, focused on fostering dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo. Previous attempts to foster dialogue under his predecessor, Miroslav Lajčák, yielded no substantial progress after Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić refused to sign the Ohrid Agreement in 2023. This would have set up a new normalization framework, but rising tensions nipped it in the bud. 

There are two main differences, however, with the seasoned diplomat Sørensen now in charge. For starters, his Danish nationality stands in sharp contrast to the Slovak nationality of Lajčák. Unlike Slovakia, Denmark recognizes Kosovo’s statehood, removing a source of potential bias that had previously surrounded the negotiations. 

Additionally, his mission parameters are now narrowed to just Serbian-Kosovar dialogue, whereas Lajčák’s purview extended to broader Western Balkan regional issues. With a shifting political landscape, a narrow focus, and favorable winds, Sørensen may just have enough space to maneuver the two nations away from further escalation. 

EU member states already are beginning to acknowledge how ineffective the sanctions have been thus far, and if reforms in Kosovo and Serbia are realized, accession could be back on the table. 

At the disposal of Kosovo’s next prime minister is normal relations, some autonomy for Kosovar Serbs, and support for the Kosovo Serb community in the form of schools, hospitals, and jobs.

On Serbia’s end, normalized relations can go both ways, alongside a reduction in rhetoric against Kosovo, its recognition, and aid for the beleaguered Kusti, who may find himself in need of a coalition partner in the form of the minority party Serb List. Even the United States could play a role; U.S. sanctions on Russian-owned oil groups in Serbia have already threatened to close Serbia’s sole oil refinery amidst a fuel crunch. Removing them could be an added bargaining chip to bring Serbia to the table and force concessions.

Whatever the eventual framework of negotiations ends up being, the road towards normalization is still long, and will face pushback from booth sides. But there has emerged a rare chance for progress in the otherwise bloody, and at times, diplomatically impossible conflicts between Kosovo and Serbia. Perhaps one of the most volatile powder kegs in the region will be emptied at a time when tensions are rising elsewhere across the world.