European Central: NATO's Eastern Flank Is Being Reinforced. But The Baltics Need More

GPS interference targeting the European Commission president’s plane in Bulgaria, drones crossing into Poland, and most recently, Russian jets loitering in Estonian airspace. These three recent provocations by the Russian armed forces have stirred a considerable amount of concern among NATO leaders.

While war with Russia has always been a relatively distant threat to Europe, the prospect of it becoming reality has slowly grown since Russia began its war with Ukraine in 2022. In the last month, it has grown exponentially more possible as Russia begins to test the bars on its post-Soviet existence.

One place that Russian President Vladimir Putin most certainly has his eyes on are the Baltic States of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia. Each state is acutely aware of the threat of Russian expansionism, representing what NATO calls its “Eastern flank”, and the three Baltic nations have long sought to protect themselves against the eventuality of an invasion. 

As NATO and Russia begin shaping up for war, the Baltic States will no doubt play a key role in the weeks and months to come. How do these three nations fit into NATO’s defense plans, how have they prepared, and what can NATO do moving forward?

Between A Rock And Its Exclave

In line with its claims in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, Russia sees any former Soviet nations as nations that should be brought back into the fold. Along with once being part of the Soviet Union, there are also still many ethnic Russians and citizens who speak Russian in Estonia, almost 29% of its population. 

This provides Russia with a clear lever to use to preempt an invasion, similarly to its invasion of Ukraine. However, the Baltic States would be a far easier target. 

While the three nations have pledged to meet the target of 5% of their GDP being spent on defense, and Estonia has actually reached that target, their military capabilities remain relatively meager. Estonia only has 7,700 active personnel, with 78,000 in reserve (although the nation has a respectable 230,000 signups for mobilization if needed); Latvia has 7,800 active personnel and 38,000 in reserve; and finally, Lithuania boasts 20,000 active personnel with 30,000 in reserve.

All three nations have been racing to up their military spending, personnel numbers, and technologically advanced weaponry since 2022. Additionally, the Baltics are supported with three stationed NATO battlegroups, with troops and equipment from across the alliance, numbering somewhere between a few hundred and 2,200. 

These forces will not repel a Russian invasion on their own, but that is part of NATO’s strategy. The alliance is following a tripwire doctrine, in which they station enough forces in the Baltics not to pose a threat but to still act as both a deterrent and a factor slowing an invasion force until more sizable reinforcements from the rest of Europe can arrive. 

The Baltics have bought in, with Estonia planning to build 600 bunkers along its 300 km border with Russia. Latvia and Lithuania are also investing in multi-layer border defense systems, involving anti-tank emplacements, minefields, and multiple line of trenches. 

But there is one massive catch in this whole plan: the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. The exclave is the biggest threat to NATO’s plan, as it sits on the Baltic Sea between Lithuania and Poland. Although it is disconnected from the rest of Russia by a 40-mile gap called the Suwałki Gap, Kaliningrad itself is heavily armed with missile, naval, and air capabilities, and recent intelligence has suggested Russia has stored around 100 tactical nuclear weapons there. 

With this exclave, in the event of a conflict Russia can pinch off the Baltic States by closing the Suwałki Gap, leaving the NATO reinforcements needed to protect Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia to travel by sea and face the risk of Russian anti-ship missiles. If this scenario comes to pass, the Baltic States would be outnumbered, outgunned, and at risk of encirclement, allowing Russia to knock out three NATO allies with relative ease.

This issue is compounded with Russia’s expanded use of hybrid warfare, a practice of using misinformation, cyberattacks, and sabotage. Over the past few years, the Baltic Sea has been a hotspot of Russia’s hybrid warfare campaign, with Russia hitting undersea communication and electric cables. 

Finally, the growing use of drones in warfare, as seen in Ukraine, poses new threats to conventional defense strategies. Drones are cost-effective for their wielders and cost-ineffective to shoot down, while also being hard to spot and increasingly good at both spotting and targeting enemy positions.

Eastern Sentry: A Revamped Approach?

With all of these threats, and especially with the recent airspace violations, NATO leaders met on September 23 to condemn Russia’s moves. But even before Estonia triggered NATO’s Article 4, which allows nations to bring an issue to the attention of NATO’s decision-making body, NATO has been ramping up its defense strategy. 

First was the announcement of Baltic Sentry in January, which is focused on the protection of assets in the Baltic Sea. Frigates, patrol aircraft, a small fleet of naval drones, and a push to integrate national surveillance assets come together to help protect critical undersea infrastructure from Russia’s “shadow fleet” of tankers used for sabotage. 

NATO nations like Poland and Sweden have also launched joint drills in the Baltic Sea to test rapid deployment strategies in the event of war, which will help NATO’s tripwire doctrine function if reinforcements are needed in the Baltics. 

Second was the recent launch of Eastern Sentry, which follows a similar model as Baltic Sentry but is focused more on countering Russian drones with new technologies as well as integrating air defenses and moving aerial assets closer to Russia. 

This has been a major lesson learned from the war in Ukraine, in which Russia has frequently targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. In early September, Polish and Lithuanian policymakers pushed for a plan to build bunkers around energy substations along with using anti-drone nets to cover critical infrastructure. Lithuania has separately allocated €500 million to develop its air defense systems, and other NATO officials have reportedly requested a 400% increase in air and missile-defense capabilities.

But these still might not be enough. That investment by Lithuania was stated by the Commander of the Lithuanian Armed Forces, Raimundas Vaikšnoras, as potentially not being able to fully protect Lithuanian airspace. Additionally, there is still the cost-efficiency problem of shooting down drones with expensive aircraft.

On the troop readiness front, Germany has followed through on a 2023 pledge to station an armored brigade in Lithuania, but the brigade is only a few hundred strong and won’t be fully operational until 2027. 

With all of these anti-drone and naval security initiatives, it seems NATO has made reasonable steps towards securing its Eastern Flank. However, the question of whether the Baltics can stall hypothetical Russian forces long enough to receive reinforcements remains an open one. Kaliningrad remains a thorn in NATO’s side, and if Russia decides to move before 2027, it could strike before NATO’s ground forces are fully ready.

Poland and Finland, both neighbors of the Baltic States with respectable military power, will undoubtedly be called upon to stretch the frontline to take the load off of the Baltics. But like all things military in Europe, true readiness will take further investment and time, and while Russia is still struggling in Ukraine, the future remains as uncertain as ever.