Checkpoint – How A Centrist Democratic Report is Choosing to Lose

At first glance reading the new report, ‘Deciding to Win’, seems encouraging, it talks of focusing on economic issues, listening to voters instead of party technocrats and…

Wait…

The first quote of praise the authors chose to highlight is from James Carville?

For those unaware of Mr. Carville and why citing him on a report on how to win should resign you to deep, rumbling belly laughs, allow me a moment to clarify.

James Carville was the lead strategist that saw Bill Clinton’s historic 1992 win. Then he went on to take a prominent role in other famous democratic presidential victories such as John Kerry’s 2004 campaign, Hillary Clinton’s 2008 campaign, and that of President Michael Bennet in 2020. Then of course there was the historic senate victory of Conor Lamb who received $1.8 million dollars from Carville’s Super PAC in the 2022 Pennsylvania race.

You may have noticed not only that my sarcastic tone is already growing tedious, but that all of those except Clinton’s 1992 win were election failures.

But just because James Carville hasn’t had a major role in winning a US election in 33 years doesn’t mean his political cred isn’t worth leaning on, or so demonstrates the report’s authors Bazelon, Pope and Kerr.

After all what’s wrong with quoting a political punchline of a man involved in Palantir’s dystopian snooping in New Orleans?

The point that must be made here, much like quoting Carville for ‘Deciding to Win’, is that the report shows concerning errors in judgement.

If this report and its praise from some Democrats represents the Centre and Right-flank of the party, it paints a depressing picture. It shows a party paranoid about its left wing, with an inability to self-critique, and demonstrates obliviousness to the danger, let alone poor electability, of meeting madness halfway.

The first alarm bells ring when the report lists its five fundamental ‘changes’ to help democrats win. The first three points seem mostly harmless, if quite unambitious and even conservatively framed. These points boil down to saying that Democrats need to talk more about the economy and popular policies, than issues voters care less about or are unpopular. So far, so obvious, right?

Then comes point four, a call for moderation. Don’t worry, only for a handful of issues… merely ‘immigration, public safety, energy production and some identity and cultural issues.’  One might note that the last election saw a radical GOP win the presidency, and majorities in the house and senate, over a moderate Democrat. However, this report will do its utmost to convince you that Kamala Harris was in fact quite the radical, and the GOP has been moderating. This position is so untethered to reality that it unfortunately requires the authors to engage in outright statistical fiddling.

Point five of the report says that Democrats should embrace criticizing ‘lobbyists, corporations, and the ultra-wealthy’. Given the authors’ involvement with political action committees and the quotes by party insiders and lobbyists at the opening, forgive my scepticism. In the next lines the authors decide, firstly, that voter frustrations do not indicate ‘a desire for socialism’, and secondly, that criticism should accompany advocacy.

Why is socialism here at all as a topic, let alone mentioned?  

We have seen the hesitation of the upper party apparatus to endorse politicians who self-describe as socialists like Zohran Mamdani. Once again, it appears the party inserts its fear of its modest number of left wing members as an actual strategic choice, one that comes before good politicking.

In the opening summary, the report claims it seeks a united vision and that every faction has something to offer. Yet 11 of the 15 politicians mentioned are from the Centre-right or right-wing of the party.

Graphs in the report are poorly made as well. For example, the first one shows the radical leftward changes in Democratic Party politics between 2014 and 2024, upon which supposedly rests Harris’ loss.

It shows a list of ten “progressive” bills. All appear to either be stable or moving drastically up in support in the last decade.

Why are these the bills chosen? What are the criteria for deciding that these are the most representative of progressivism?

Well, the authors don’t explain that.

Are they all the same kinds of bills? Do they all show the same change over time?

Nope, some are ‘resolutions’ which only call for something to be adopted, like one calling for a Green New Deal. Others are bills that call for a ‘study’ of a topic, the ‘Reparations Study Bill’. Others are serious pieces of legislation that have provisions, plans and involve serious changes like the Equality Act or Medicare for All. 

Temporally too, it’s a mess.  The graph shows bills begun in the ‘80s (i.e. the Reparation Study Bill), along the same unlabelled timeline as those proposed in 2023 (i.e. Democracy Restoration Act). Furthermore, it also doesn’t explain if and how bills changed, or if they stayed as “progressive” as they originally were in subsequent votes and rewrites. The addendum to this “graph” does admit some bills were from after 2015 but neither mentions the DRA, nor indicates timescale. It is a hot mess to say the least.

Statistics throughout the report are also dubious. For example, in part five, Deciding To Win claims Medicare for All has a 39% approval rating, seeming to argue for a turn to the center. But Reuters recent polls from last year’s election say its 64% . An Economist poll from July this year put it at 59%. Even a Gallup poll from 5 years ago, which framed Medicare for All as an oppositional dichotomy with private healthcare, still had 43% support despite the leading framing of the question. How did the authors obtain the lowest polling recorded for any Medicare for All question?

Two politicians the report highlights as models for Democrats, from the right wing of the party strangely, are just not who the authors claim they are. Jared Golden, a democrat who has openly supported Trump’s tariffs, barely squeaked out a victory in Maine last year (50.3% to 49.7%) in a district that has seen eight out of its last ten representatives be Democrats. The other, Ruben Gallego, only recently left the Progressive caucus and moderated his position for a tougher race. He won his senate election by 50.1% to 47.7% in 2022. To clarify, this isn’t bad, but unimpressively it’s the same margin as the previous democratic winner (2.4% Gallego and 2.35% for Sinema). So how are Golden or Gallego models?

Even light pressure on this report has revealed paranoia about “The Left”, sloppy statistics and heroes without heroics. In fact, there is also no mention of how to reign in the party’s “lobbyists and elites” it claims to criticize. Furthermore, it admits Biden’s decision to run again was a mistake, yet no fingers are pointed, nor institutional changes recommended.

At a time when powerful economic messaging and populism abounds, this report by lobbyists and consultants, waffling about moderation, isn’t “Deciding to Win”, it’s choosing to lose.