Latin Analysis: Guatemala Confronts Gangs Ahead Of A Sweeping Institutional Reset
Pablo de Viaje
A series of coordinated prison riots in January 2026 has pushed Guatemala into a nationwide state of emergency, reviving long-standing questions about how the state confronts organized crime. These events unfold against the backdrop of persistent gang violence, overcrowded prisons, and years of mounting pressure on successive governments to bring the situation under control. This is also a moment of unusual political consequence in the nation, as Guatemala prepares for a sweeping renewal of key judicial and oversight institutions. The crisis offers a window into the security strategy of the Arévalo administration, and into whether the imminent institutional reset can address the deeper institutional weaknesses that allow gangs to operate and endure.
Prison Riots Trigger Emergency Measures
Guatemalans have been seeing heavier security in the streets since the government declared a nationwide state of emergency on January 18. The measure came after an eruption of gang-related violence in the capital city, following a series of prison riots at three distinct facilities located across the country.
The day before the unrest in the capital, inmates affiliated with the infamous Barrio 18 gang held 46 people hostage in the three prisons to demand that their imprisoned gang leaders be held in less restrictive conditions. The situation escalated the following day after security forces liberated the hostages, with gang members launching armed attacks against police in retaliation. The alleged leader of Barrio 18, identified as Aldo Dupie under the alias el lobo or the wolf, was being held in one of the prisons in Escuintla, south of Guatemala City. Photographs from the aftermath of the prison raid show him bloodstained and handcuffed, and back in the custody of the security forces. Most of the subsequent retaliatory attacks occurred in Guatemala City and its surrounding areas, resulting in the deaths of 10 police officers. That evening, President Bernardo Arévalo announced the emergency declaration.
The 30-day nationwide state of emergency had to be approved by the opposition-controlled Congress the next day, which it did with 149 in favor and one against. The measure meant that the right of assembly was suspended and that individuals could be arrested and interrogated without a court order. A few days after the measure came into effect, police and soldiers took their new powers to the center of Barrio 18’s operations in the north of Guatemala City, a district called Zone 18. Reports from the area described police asking passing motorists for identification, or patting people down for weapons.
The cluster of neighbourhoods in Zone 18 are infamous due to gang violence. Last year, the district saw 126 homicides, more than any other of the 24 districts in Guatemala City. Even after the prison riots and attacks on police, the bodies of one woman and two teen girls were found shot in the street. Police officials argued that the state of emergency allows them to confront Barrio 18 criminal structures, and that of other gangs, that create the environment for such attacks. Nationally, the homicide rate in Guatemala was 16.1 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2025, which is more than double the global average.
Since his election in 2023, President Arévalo has faced pressure to bring this violence under control. Last year, an anti-gang law approved by Congress designated Barrio 18, alongside another criminal organization called Mara Salvatrucha, as terrorist organizations. The law – which followed the escape of several members of Barrio 18 from prison – also meant that gang members convicted of crimes would face increased prison sentence.
At the same time, Guatemala’s prisons are under strain, and controlling them has become an acute challenge, as the recent riots demonstrate. This is exacerbated by overcrowding – since 2000, the prison population in Guatemala has tripled. One issue that contributes to this is the overuse of pretrial detention – this means that in some cases, detainees can serve the equivalent of their prospective sentence before actually appearing in court. As a part of Arévalo’s security policy, the government announced in October 2025 that it would build a maximum-security facility to hold 2,000 prisoners.
Can An Institutional Reset Curb Gang Violence?
2026 marks an important year for Guatemala’s institutions, as five major bodies are scheduled for new appointments and leadership transitions. This is an unprecedented alignment, making it the most significant institutional reset since Guatemala’s return to democracy in 1986. These bodies include the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the attorney general, the comptroller general, and the rector of the University of San Carlos – and they all will be renewed within a five-month window.
These five key positions are involved in upholding the rule of law, making this a pivotal moment for the future of Guatemala’s democracy and institutions. The rules of selection are a hybrid system that involve direct appointments or shortlists, by the President, Congress, and various bodies like the Supreme Court or Higher University Council. While this system is designed to ensure independent, merit-based selection, it remains highly vulnerable to manipulation, political influence, and a lack of transparency in the nominating processes. This begs the question of whether Guatemala’s institutions, following the reset, will ultimately serve the public or remain instruments for criminal in the coming years.
Guatemala has faced entrenched corruption for many years, with powerful criminal networks co-opting the justice and electoral systems. This has affected judicial independence and in turn, deteriorated public trust. The election of President Arévalo in 2023 with over 60% of the vote brought hope for change, due to his anti-corruption, reformist campaign. However, his popularity fell when his ability to deliver on these changes was constrained by the political forces at play in the legislature and judicial system. In particular, a coalition of politicians, economic elites, and criminal groups known as the pacto de corruptos, or the Pact of the Corrupt, have controlled key institutions and obstructed efforts towards accountability and reform. Members of this network are known for their tendency to protect allies from prosecution and dismantle anti-corruption reforms.
Therefore, there is a window for change this year that could have substantial implications for how the rule of law is implemented in Guatemala. The impact on criminal gang networks and in turn, the safety of Guatemalans, could be substantial.
The prison riots that triggered the state of emergency exposed the extent to which powerful criminal networks are entrenched in Guatemala. Whether the current security crackdown leads to durable improvements or merely a temporary lull in violence may depend on how the country navigates this institutional turning point. The emergency powers may dissuade gang activity in the short term, but without a credible and transparent judicial system, criminal networks could continue to survive. The coming months therefore represent a test of whether the Arévalo government can translate public demands for accountability into institutional change.