In America: Supreme Court Strikes Down Major Campaign Finance Law

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Earlier this month, the Supreme Court ruled 6-3 in National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission that political parties may make unlimited party-coordinated expenditures for their candidates. This landmark ruling represents a major win for advocates of First Amendment rights for political parties and candidates. 

National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission asks whether limits on coordinated party expenditures under the Federal Election Commission Act (FECA) violate the First Amendment. FECA governs the ability of national and state party committees to make a limited amount of party-coordinated expenditures on behalf of the parties’ candidates for political office. FECA’s expenditure limits vary by the office and the state in which a candidate is running. The National Republican Senatorial Committee, the National Republican Congressional Committee, alongside then-Senator J.D. Vance and Representative Steve Chabot, sued the Federal Election Commission (FEC) for unconstitutionally restricting their ability to coordinate campaign advertising with their candidates. 

The plaintiffs' challenge started in federal court in Ohio before reaching the 6th Circuit US Court of Appeals. Here, Chief Judge Jeffrey Sutton acknowledged the validity of the plaintiffs’ argument but abided by precedent from the Supreme Court’s decision in 2001. The case then moved to the Supreme Court after a successful appeal from the plaintiffs. 

Previously, the 2001 Supreme Court decision in Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee upheld the same FECA limits at issue in National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission. Today, the plaintiffs argue that these FECA limits are rendered obsolete by developments in campaign finance law, the rise of “Super PACs,” and shifts in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.

Indeed, the 2025-2026 Supreme Court term saw a rise in ideologically split decisions between the 6 Republican-appointed justices and the 3 Democratic-appointed justices. 15.2% of the court’s decisions were split 6-3 in the 2024-2025 term, whereas this year’s term saw that figure jump to 28.8%.

Writing for the court, Justice Kavanaugh commented on the recent ruling. 

“...treats all political parties equally. It will allow all political parties—including the DNC and RNC and the respective Senate and House campaign committees, as well as other parties and party committees—to participate more freely and compete more fully in the political process, and to coordinate more closely with their candidates.” – Justice Kavanaugh writing in the majority opinion

Kavanaugh’s argument in support of the majority opinion is that the rationale behind FECA was to prevent quid pro quo corruption, officially defined as contributions in exchange for official action. Supporters of upholding FECA’s party-coordinated expenditure limits argue that these must remain in place to prevent earmarking, or the practice of circumventing limits on donating money by donating money to a political party and then instructing the political party to use those funds on a specific candidate. However, Kavanaugh argues that better measures exist that do not restrict free speech under FECA limits. For example, base limits on expenditures, federal disclosure laws, and laws that treat earmarked contributions as direct contributions to a candidate all address concerns about corruption without being unconstitutional. 

Kavanaugh also rejected arguments that the court should adhere to precedent set in its 2001 campaign finance case. Similar to the plaintiff's original appeal to the Supreme Court, Kavanaugh argued that the rationale outlined in the 2001 case has been rejected by subsequent cases and is no longer good law.

The majority opinion encapsulates the court's evolution in its view of campaign expenditures. Since Chief Justice Roberts was appointed to the Supreme Court in 2005, a string of decisions related to the reassessment of campaign finance rules can be readily identified.

In 2007, the Court struck down a law regulating advertisements that avoid regulations by clearly targeting candidates without mentioning words like “vote for” or “vote against.” In a dissenting opinion on this case, Justice Souter commented on this decision. 

“Neither Congress’s decisions nor our own have understood the corrupting influence of money in politics as being limited to outright bribery or discrete quid pro quo; campaign finance reform has instead consistently focused on the more pervasive distortion of electoral institutions by concentrated wealth, on the special access and guaranteed favor that sap the representative integrity of American government and defy public confidence in its institutions.”

In 2008, the Court struck down a law that allowed candidates facing extremely wealthy opponents to raise larger contributions until they received parity with their opponents' wealth. This decision effectively made it impossible for opponents of wealthy candidates to close the financial canyon lying between them. 

 In 2010, the infamous Citizens United case allowed unions and corporations the ability to spend with no limits so long as that money was not given directly or coordinated with the candidate. This decision ultimately allowed the creation of Super PACs and the explosion of independent political spending that followed. More than $1 billion was spent on elections in 2012 by outside groups, a figure that outstrips the FEC's total reported spending from 1980 to 2010. 

This pattern of striking down or reassessing campaign finance laws has been a hallmark of the Roberts Court and continues through today. Justice Kagan wrote the dissenting opinion in National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission and was joined by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jackson. Justice Kagan wrote that the Court’s ruling: 

“...ushers in the same opportunities for quid pro quo corruption that the contribution limits were meant to check. As a result, a donor will be able to give a party as much as half a million dollars (as compared to the $7,000 he can give directly to the candidate) to cover the candidate’s bills. And the candidate can seek just such a donation.” – Justice Kagan in her dissenting opinion 

Ultimately, the latest Supreme Court decision on campaign finance law reflects the decades-long history that this court has retained when ruling on this topic. This trend seeks to modernize how money and politics interact in an era when both are experiencing rapid growth and change.